



UAP Coalition  
The Netherlands

# Improved EU Energy Security by Acknowledging & Protecting Infrastructure against UAP Threats

November 20th, 2024

UAP Coalition Netherlands Feedback to Call for Evidence for a Fitness check evaluating the EU's energy security architecture.



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## Summary

UAP Coalition Netherlands (UAPCNL) identified significant gaps in the current EU energy security architecture in addressing the low-probability but high-risk threat posed by Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP). This oversight is concerning, especially as other countries recognize UAP as a legitimate security and safety risk. To address this, UAPCNL proposes three key actions namely;

1. Incorporating robust Investigation and Research for UAP into the EU's energy security framework is essential to future-proof Europe's critical infrastructure. By establishing formal reporting mechanisms and conducting thorough risk assessments the EU can ensure that its energy systems are resilient against all potential threats, including the challenges posed by UAP. Multi- and transdisciplinary research and innovative approaches are required, with sufficient funding through the EU research and innovation programme Horizon Europe.
2. Through proactive policies and measures, Europe can enhance the safety and reliability of its energy supply, regardless of the origin or nature of UAP. UAP integration in Energy Security Policies to address emerging challenges for energy security is necessary to ensure the protection of critical infrastructure. This should be done by integrating findings from investigation and research into existing security protocols and by integrating UAP monitoring into surveillance frameworks. Integration of UAP in a future EU preparedness strategy is also recommended. By expanding airspace and satellite surveillance, utilizing AI-driven detection, and coordinating efforts across borders, the EU can effectively monitor UAP activity and mitigate potential risks. Enhanced surveillance that accounts for UAP threats will fortify Europe's energy systems against both conventional and unconventional threats, ensuring a more secure and resilient energy future.
3. International Collaboration is crucial in strengthening the EU's energy security, particularly in the face of threats such as UAP. By building global partnerships, coordinating surveillance and monitoring efforts, sharing intelligence, and engaging in collaborative research, the EU can play a leading role in integrating UAP risks into energy security. A conference on UAP and energy security could be organized involving the EU institutions, Member States, UAP experts and stakeholders from the energy community.



## What is UAP Coalition Netherlands?

UAP Coalition Netherlands<sup>1</sup> is an independent non profit NGO that represents the interests of professionals within aviation, armed forces and law enforcement who observe(d) Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena. We promote support, research, awareness, cooperation and regulations regarding UAP.

## What are Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena?

Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP) is anything in space and air, on land, and in the sea that cannot be identified. In the past, the term Unidentified Flying Object (UFO) was used but as improved sensor platforms started detecting more phenomena in other domains (in particular the sea), a new acronym and definition was adopted.

## Why UAP Coalition Netherlands?

The Coalition was created out of necessity because professionals within aviation, armed forces and law enforcement do not feel safe and heard if they have experience with UAP.

In addition, due to technological developments, UAP are observed also in proximity of nuclear facilities and other energy infrastructures and this requires a need for awareness, an improved EU reporting system and serious research, resulting in better energy security and protection.

The positive developments of legislation and regulations in other countries show that the European Union cannot lag behind on the topic of UAP. UAPCNL wants to inform, advise and support the EU government and involved organizations in the EU about UAP.

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<sup>1</sup> <https://uapcoalitienederland.nl/en>



## UAP Are Real

As technological progress increases, observations<sup>2</sup> are increasingly supported by a range of sensors and measuring instruments including radar, infrared, cameras and other sensor platforms. This is why it becomes more difficult to dismiss UAP as fiction.

Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena appear to demonstrate a particular focus on energy infrastructure, with a worrisome frequency of sightings reported near atomic facilities<sup>3</sup>, nuclear-powered vessels, and military sites housing nuclear weapons<sup>4</sup>.

France has an official government organization<sup>5</sup> (GEIPAN) that collects, analyzes, and reports on UAP. It operates under the French Space Agency<sup>6</sup> (CNES) and focuses exclusively on cases within France.

Former United States Presidents such as Barack Obama, Donald Trump and other prominent figures have publicly spoken about UAP. In various interviews<sup>7</sup> they confirm the existence of objects that cannot be explained and that these are observed in American airspace and around the globe.

In 2022 the United States Pentagon created a department (AARO<sup>8</sup>) where government personnel can report their UAP sightings. So far over 1600 cases have been filed and AARO releases a report<sup>9</sup> every year on their findings. Several hundred are still not explained.

Since 2022 the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics has a special committee<sup>10</sup> dedicated to improving aerospace safety by increasing scientific knowledge about UAP and reducing stigma and barriers to the study of UAP.

On January 25, 2024, the U.S. Department of Defense Office of Inspector General released<sup>11</sup> a UAP report. The conclusion is *“We determined that the DoD has no overarching UAP policy and, as a result, it lacks assurance that national security and flight safety threats to the United States from UAP have been identified and mitigated”*.

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<sup>2</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ygB4EZ7ggig>

<sup>3</sup>

<https://www.explorescu.org/post/uap-indications-analysis-1945-1975-united-states-atomic-warfare-complex>

<sup>4</sup> <https://www.ufohastings.com/book>

<sup>5</sup> <https://www.cnes-geipan.fr/en>

<sup>6</sup> <https://cnes.fr/en>

<sup>7</sup> <https://youtu.be/x4PecCSizk>

<sup>8</sup> <https://www.aaro.mil/>

<sup>9</sup>

<https://media.defense.gov/2024/Nov/14/2003583603/-1/-1/0/FY24-CONSOLIDATED-ANNUAL-REPORT-ON-UAP-508.PDF>

<sup>10</sup> <https://aiaauap.org/>

<sup>11</sup>

<https://www.dodig.mil/In-the-Spotlight/Article/3656428/press-release-evaluation-of-the-dods-actions-regarding-unidentified-anomalous-p/>



## Introduction

UAP Coalition Netherlands (UAPCNL) welcomes the European Commission's initiative to gather evidence for the purpose of a Fitness Check<sup>12</sup> evaluating the EU's energy security architecture. This document provides the views and input from UAPCNL on the request from the European Commission. The concerns mentioned in the initiative are indeed pressing and require immediate attention.

As the European Union strengthens its energy security in response to threats from geopolitical instability, climate risks, and the clean energy transition, it is essential to address emerging challenges that could undermine the integrity of critical energy infrastructure. Among these challenges are Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP), which have been observed near sensitive sites, including nuclear and energy facilities, across the globe. Documented sightings suggest UAP could pose physical and cyber security risks to critical infrastructure, a threat that is not yet recognized in the EU's current energy security strategies.

UAP Coalition Netherlands urges the European Commission to recognize UAP as a potential risk factor in the fitness check of the EU's energy security architecture. While significant progress has been made in ensuring resilience, gaps remain, particularly regarding unconventional threats that fall outside traditional frameworks. The energy crisis triggered by Russia's attack on Ukraine demonstrated that infrastructure protection must account for both known and unpredictable high-impact scenarios.

The existing architecture prioritizes cybersecurity, climate risks, and geopolitical challenges, but the frequency of UAP sightings near energy assets necessitates a proactive and comprehensive approach to risk preparedness. Ignoring UAP may leave critical infrastructure vulnerable to potential disruptions, either through direct interference or collateral consequences from monitoring unidentified objects. This concern becomes even more urgent as the clean energy transition increases the number of decentralized and renewable energy systems, introducing new vulnerabilities.

The EU's energy security framework should be expanded to include UAP risks. This call for evidence emphasizes the need for investigative processes, international collaboration, and enhanced surveillance to protect the integrity of Europe's energy infrastructure. By integrating UAP risk monitoring and mitigation strategies, the EU can ensure its energy systems are resilient against both conventional and emerging threats, including low-probability, high-impact scenarios.

We also call on the European Commission to support Member States in incorporating UAP risk into the broader assessment of physical and cybersecurity, ensuring Europe's energy infrastructure is fully protected and future-proofed against all potential threats.

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<sup>12</sup>

[https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14392-Energy-security-architecture-fitness-check\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/14392-Energy-security-architecture-fitness-check_en)



## Investigation and Research

As the European Union evaluates the fitness of its energy security architecture, one critical aspect that remains underexplored is the integration of investigative processes related to Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP). Given the frequency of UAP sightings near sensitive infrastructure such as nuclear power plants and energy grids, it is imperative to establish a systematic investigative framework to assess and address the potential risks they pose.

### The Need for Investigation

Energy security relies on the physical and cyber resilience of infrastructure, yet UAP present a novel, ambiguous challenge that is not fully understood. Incidents involving UAP, which have been documented near energy installations worldwide, suggest that these phenomena could interfere with energy production, transmission, and storage systems, either directly or indirectly. Unexplained aerial activity around such infrastructure could result in operational disruptions, security breaches, or unanticipated impacts on critical systems. For example, a French study<sup>13</sup> conducted in 2015 found that *“The link between nuclear activities and UAP, which has long been suspected and considered, is now for the first time measured and appears surprisingly high”*.

In France in 2014 unidentified ‘mystery drones’ were observed at at least seven nuclear power plants across the country<sup>14</sup>. Environmental lobby group Greenpeace, whose activists have in the past staged protests at nuclear plants in France, denied any involvement in these mysterious pilotless flight activities. An official governmental investigation was conducted<sup>15</sup>, involving experts from ministries and staff from EDF which manages the country's reactor, and other experts. Hearings were held in the French Senate and the results were presented in an extensive report, published in early 2015<sup>16</sup>. However the Senate was unable to determine who were behind these drones and what the intentions may have been. EDF denied threats, and said that “nuclear stations in France have been designed to resist external stress”. It should be noted that France has detailed regulations in place regarding drones<sup>17</sup>, but it is not clear if these are sufficient to address threats from such ‘mystery drones’.

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[https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281470789\\_Spatial\\_Point\\_Pattern\\_Analysis\\_of\\_the\\_Unidentified\\_Aerial\\_Phenomena\\_in\\_France](https://www.researchgate.net/publication/281470789_Spatial_Point_Pattern_Analysis_of_the_Unidentified_Aerial_Phenomena_in_France)

<sup>14</sup> <https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0J11V/> and <https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/oct/31/more-drones-spotted-over-french-nuclear-power-stations>

<sup>15</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=14YYsge5Jgc>

<sup>16</sup> <https://www.senat.fr/rap/r14-267/r14-267.html>

<sup>17</sup> <https://uavcoach.com/drone-laws-in-france/>



Also in other countries, for example the UK<sup>18</sup> and the US<sup>19</sup> incursions of unidentified 'drones' at nuclear power plants have been observed in the past years and also in many of these cases the origin of these 'drones' could not be determined.

Independent experts have said that governments should reassess the balance of risks and benefits of nuclear power due to the increased danger from terrorists targeting them with modern and readily available hardware such as unmanned drones<sup>20</sup>

The lack of a formalized investigative process leaves a significant gap in energy security preparedness. Without standardized procedures to investigate and analyze UAP sightings, the potential risks remain unquantified, and security protocols are inadequately informed. Establishing an investigative framework would provide the necessary foundation to understand these phenomena and develop appropriate responses to protect Europe's energy systems.

### **The importance of a reporting system for UAP**

The first step in investigating UAP in the context of energy security is the creation of a structured reporting system across all EU Member States. There have been several attempts<sup>21</sup> by UAPCNL to inform the EC on the necessity of such a structured reporting system in the areas of Defence, Space but also Aviation. In the context of this particular feedback Energy infrastructure operators, security personnel, and relevant agencies must be equipped with clear guidelines for reporting UAP sightings. A centralized database should be established to collate these reports, providing a comprehensive overview of UAP activities near energy sites.

### *Interagency Cooperation and International Collaboration*

Given the transboundary nature of UAP, cooperative mechanisms between different EU Member States, and also with international partners, are essential. An EU UAP Unit could be established to investigate UAP reports in a coordinated manner, ensuring a unified response across Europe. In addition, collaboration with global allies experienced in UAP research, such as the United States, could facilitate the exchange of best practices and technological resources to enhance investigative capabilities.

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<sup>18</sup> <https://d-fendsolutions.com/blog/drone-defense-for-nuclear-plant-security/>

<sup>19</sup>

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidhambling/2020/09/07/dozens-more-drone-incursions-over-us-nuclear-power-plants-revealed/>

<sup>20</sup>

<https://www.newsweek.com/2015/03/06/most-french-nuclear-plants-should-be-shut-down-over-drone-threat-309019.html>

<sup>21</sup> <https://uapcoalitienederland.nl/en/news/>





### *Risk Assessment and Analysis*

Investigations into UAP incidents should be complemented by comprehensive risk assessments tailored to the energy sector. This involves analyzing the patterns of UAP sightings, potential impacts on energy infrastructure, and their correlation with other security threats such as cyberattacks. Developing an analytical framework to assess UAP-related risks would allow for the identification of vulnerabilities in energy systems and the development of targeted mitigation strategies.

### *Research and Development*

Ongoing research into UAP behavior and characteristics is crucial for understanding how they may affect energy infrastructure. The EU could fund dedicated research programs aimed at developing technological solutions to detect, classify, and mitigate potential UAP threats as part of the EU Research and Innovation programme Horizon Europe. The inclusion of advanced artificial intelligence and machine learning systems in UAP monitoring efforts, could significantly improve response times and accuracy in identifying potential risks. In the United States, the NASA Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena Independent Study Team published its final report<sup>22</sup> in 2023, with a series of recommendations on how the agency can advance their understanding of UAP. This includes better use of earth observing satellites (operated by NASA and commercial remote sensing industry); use of multiple, well-calibrated sensors; application of state-of-the-art computational and data-analysis techniques such as Artificial Intelligence; use of modern crowdsourcing techniques, including open-source smartphone-based apps; and integration of UAP reporting in the US aviation safety reporting system. NASA also promised to continue their research on UAP and appointed a special UAP Research Director.

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<https://www.nasa.gov/news-release/update-nasa-shares-uap-independent-study-report-names-director/>



## UAP integration in Energy Security Policies

In the context of energy security, enhanced surveillance is a critical measure to safeguard vital infrastructure from both conventional and emerging threats<sup>23</sup>. As Europe transitions toward a more decentralized and sustainable energy system, new vulnerabilities arise, making surveillance capabilities increasingly important. One such emerging challenge is the presence of UAP near energy infrastructure. Integrating UAP monitoring into enhanced surveillance strategies is essential for the protection of energy assets and the overall resilience of the European Union's energy grid.

### **The Importance of Enhanced Surveillance for Energy Security**

Surveillance plays a key role in protecting critical energy infrastructure, ensuring that threats are detected early and managed effectively. Traditional surveillance measures—such as physical security, airspace monitoring, and cybersecurity—have primarily focused on known risks like sabotage, terrorism, and cyberattacks. However, the emergence of UAP as a potential threat requires the expansion of these monitoring frameworks to cover unconventional and poorly understood risks.

UAP sightings near energy installations, including nuclear power plants, oil refineries, and electrical grids, pose a potential risk to both physical and cyber security. A few examples are mentioned in the chapter “Energy related incidents with UAP” on page 16. These phenomena have exhibited advanced aerial capabilities<sup>24</sup>, including high-speed maneuvers and unexplained behavior, raising concerns about their possible impact on sensitive energy systems. Failure to monitor and respond to UAP could lead to operational disruptions, security breaches, or the inadvertent escalation of risk through misidentification.

### *Integrating UAP into Enhanced Surveillance Systems*

Current airspace surveillance around critical energy infrastructure is typically focused on conventional aircraft, drones, or known threats. To account for UAP, the scope of airspace monitoring should be expanded. This could include deploying or updating<sup>25</sup> advanced radar systems with enhanced detection capabilities to track objects that do not conform to typical aircraft patterns. For example, the United States Pentagon is developing a GREMLIN<sup>26</sup> system specifically for UAP. Real-time data on UAP activity near energy installations would enable timely alerts and allow for rapid response measures to prevent potential disruptions.

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<sup>23</sup> <https://youtu.be/Bf-Yyt2WncU?si=wc-ANiMxmVPePtWS>

<sup>24</sup> <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7514271/>

<sup>25</sup>

<https://www.defensedaily.com/radar-enhancements-may-explain-uptick-in-detection-of-objects-in-u-s-airspace-officials-say/pentagon/#:~:text=%E2%80%9CRadars%20essentially%20filter%20out%20information,more%20information%2C%E2%80%9D%20VanHerck%20said.>

<sup>26</sup> <https://www.space.com/pentagon-ufo-uap-office-aaro-sensors-anomalies-orbit>



## *Utilizing Satellite Surveillance*

Satellite technology offers a unique vantage point for monitoring UAP activity over large geographic areas. The EU could leverage its satellite infrastructure to improve the detection and tracking of UAP in the vicinity of energy infrastructure, particularly in remote or vulnerable locations. By integrating satellite data with terrestrial monitoring systems, a more comprehensive surveillance network could be established, improving the ability to detect and analyze UAP at varying altitudes and speeds.

UAPCNL provided feedback<sup>27</sup> on 27 November 2023 on the EC Call for Evidence regarding the EU Space Law, in which they emphasized using satellite surveillance for detecting UAP. Unfortunately, even though the EC in her response<sup>28</sup> to previously reported sky observations stated that; “*That is why the European Commission is proposing to the 27 Member States of the European Union (EU) that the EU should increase its ability to detect objects in the space environment around the Earth. This is partly to help us better identify the UAPs that you have seen and the many pieces of space debris that endanger the many uses of space*”, UAP have **not** been integrated into the proposed EU Space Law or other EU satellite programs.

## *Deploying Drones for Targeted Monitoring*

In addition to traditional surveillance methods, drones can be deployed for targeted monitoring of UAP activity near energy sites. Drones equipped with advanced sensors, including thermal imaging and infrared capabilities, can provide a closer and more flexible examination of UAP in areas where ground-based surveillance may be limited. This agile response capability would enhance situational awareness and provide real-time data that could be used to assess any potential risks posed by UAP.

## *Leveraging AI and Machine Learning*

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) into surveillance systems can improve the detection and classification of UAP. By training algorithms to recognize unusual flight patterns or anomalies in radar and satellite data, AI-driven surveillance systems can automatically flag potential UAP activity, reducing the reliance on manual monitoring and improving detection accuracy. AI could also be used to analyze historical UAP data, helping to identify patterns or correlations with other security threats, such as cyberattacks. For example China<sup>29</sup> is using AI to detect patterns in their UAP reports and NASA is also using<sup>30</sup> AI and ML researching the topic.

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<sup>27</sup>

[https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13971-EU-Space-Law-new-rules-for-safe-resilient-and-sustainable-space-activities/F3444826\\_en](https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/have-your-say/initiatives/13971-EU-Space-Law-new-rules-for-safe-resilient-and-sustainable-space-activities/F3444826_en)

<sup>28</sup>

[https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/13376/response/48762/attach/5/UFO%20UAP%20EC%20reply.pdf?cookie\\_passthrough=1](https://www.asktheeu.org/en/request/13376/response/48762/attach/5/UFO%20UAP%20EC%20reply.pdf?cookie_passthrough=1)

<sup>29</sup>

<https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3136078/china-military-uses-ai-track-rapidly-increasing-ufos>

<sup>30</sup> <https://aimagazine.com/data-and-analytics/nasa-aims-to-use-ai-and-ml-for-new-uap-ufo-research>



*Coordinated Surveillance Across Borders*

UAP often appear in multiple countries, crossing national borders without recognition or permission. To improve energy security, the EU should coordinate its enhanced surveillance efforts across Member States, establishing a unified monitoring system that shares real-time data on UAP activity. This approach would allow for seamless tracking of UAP as they move between jurisdictions, ensuring that no critical information is lost and that energy security measures are aligned across borders. Such cooperation could be facilitated through a shared surveillance network, supported by EU agencies, national governments, and private sector partners.

*Integration with Existing Threat Monitoring Systems*

UAP monitoring should not exist in isolation but should be integrated into existing surveillance and threat detection frameworks. Many energy security systems already include advanced monitoring for cybersecurity threats, airspace violations, and physical attacks. Incorporating UAP detection into these systems will streamline responses and ensure that all potential threats are addressed through a unified security protocol. Enhanced surveillance can include UAP in risk assessments, improving the overall readiness of security teams to address any unexpected phenomena.

*Integration with Existing Security Protocols*

To effectively address UAP-related threats, investigative findings must be integrated into existing energy security protocols. This could include adapting physical security measures, enhancing airspace monitoring around critical energy sites, and improving cyber defenses where relevant. Furthermore, real-time surveillance systems, such as radar and satellite technology, should be enhanced to detect and track UAP in proximity to energy installations.



## International Collaboration

As the European Union strengthens its energy security framework in light of emerging threats, international cooperation must play a central role. Cross-border collaboration is essential to safeguarding the EU's critical energy infrastructure, particularly when addressing unconventional and poorly understood challenges such as Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena (UAP). Given the global nature of UAP reports and their potential implications for energy security, integrating UAP-related intelligence and investigative efforts into the broader framework of international cooperation is vital for ensuring the EU's energy resilience.

UAP sightings have been documented<sup>31</sup> worldwide, often near key infrastructure like nuclear facilities, power plants, and energy grids. These sightings represent a potential threat that transcends national borders, and without coordinated efforts, individual member states may lack the capacity to respond effectively. UAP could disrupt energy production, compromise physical security, and even act as precursors to more complex cyber or physical threats. The challenge posed by these phenomena necessitates robust international partnerships to share data, pool resources, and develop joint security strategies.

### *Global UAP Intelligence Sharing*

Many UAP incidents involve advanced aerial technology or unexplained behavior, making intelligence sharing between international allies crucial. The EU can work closely with global partners who have extensive experience in UAP research, such as the United States, which has already made significant strides in studying UAP through the Pentagon's recent initiatives. By establishing formal channels for exchanging UAP data, European nations can benefit from the insights and findings of other countries, enhancing situational awareness and improving energy security strategies. In May 2023 there was a Five Eyes meeting<sup>32</sup> in the United States (US, Canada, UK, Australia and New Zealand) about UAP and security. The United States promotes international cooperation<sup>33</sup> on UAP and considers UAP a national security threat.

### *Coordinated Monitoring and Surveillance*

Joint efforts in surveillance and monitoring of UAP near critical energy infrastructure are key to timely detection and response. Establishing real-time information-sharing systems between EU Member States and global allies will create a unified network of airspace monitoring, providing early warnings of potential UAP activity. This can include sharing radar data, satellite imagery, and reports from energy facility operators, ensuring that all stakeholders have access to the most up-to-date information.

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<sup>31</sup> <https://www.youtube.com/@UAPCoalitieNL/playlists>

<sup>32</sup> <https://www.cbc.ca/news/world/five-eyes-ufo-briefing-1.6868907>

<sup>33</sup>

<https://defensescoop.com/2024/11/14/uap-aaro-chief-unveils-pentagon-annual-caseload-analysis-new-efforts/>



## *Collaborative Research and Technological Development*

Research into UAP and their potential impacts on energy security should not be conducted in isolation. International partnerships in scientific research and technology development can lead to breakthroughs in understanding the nature of UAP and their interactions with energy systems. The EU can collaborate with research institutions in countries that are leading UAP studies, coordinating efforts to develop detection technologies, threat analysis models, and response mechanisms specifically designed to protect energy infrastructure. On February 23 2023 the Office of the Chief Science Advisor of Canada announced<sup>34</sup> an investigation into UAP. The aim is to investigate how UAP reporting occurs and can be improved, with a planned report in 2024. In France there is a research organization named GEIPAN<sup>35</sup>, which focuses on their country and is part of the French Space Agency.

## *Standardized Protocols and Joint Investigations*

Creating standardized protocols for investigating UAP sightings and incidents is essential to developing a coordinated international response. These protocols should include joint investigation teams, combining expertise from different countries to assess UAP incidents in an organized and systematic manner. For energy security, this could involve cross-border teams with technical, military, and cybersecurity experts who can investigate any potential UAP-related disruptions or risks to energy assets. In January 2024 the United States Congress proposed<sup>36</sup> legislation which aims to standardize UAP reporting for civilian pilots, protect their identities, promote and implement reporting mechanisms and mandate FAA investigations as UAP are an aviation risk. Also on March 15, 2024, it was announced<sup>37</sup> that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff take the subject of UAP and security very seriously and have drawn up a guideline that has been shared worldwide with all parts of the American armed forces.

## *Intergovernmental Dialogues and Diplomatic Engagement*

International cooperation on UAP should be a priority in diplomatic dialogues, especially between major energy-producing and consuming nations. The EU can take the lead in initiating discussions about UAP as part of broader energy security agreements, treaties, and defense partnerships. Engaging other countries in open discussions about UAP risks will help establish common ground, mitigate potential conflicts of interest, and foster a spirit of transparency and mutual support in addressing this emerging threat.

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<sup>34</sup>

<https://www.ctvnews.ca/sci-tech/document-reveals-first-known-canadian-ufo-study-in-nearly-30-years-now-underway-1.6293124>

<sup>35</sup> <https://www.cnes-geipan.fr/en>

<sup>36</sup>

[https://robertgarcia.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/robertgarcia.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/garcro\\_065\\_xml.pdf](https://robertgarcia.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/robertgarcia.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/garcro_065_xml.pdf)

<sup>37</sup> <https://uapregister.substack.com/p/defense-document-reveals-concern>



**EU Leadership in Global UAP-Energy Security Cooperation**

The European Union is well-positioned to lead global efforts in integrating UAP risk into the wider context of energy security. By coordinating with NATO, the United Nations, and other international bodies, the EU can advocate for the creation of global norms and frameworks that include UAP considerations in the protection of critical infrastructure.

As geopolitical tensions rise and unconventional threats increase, UAP represent a unique challenge that can only be addressed through collective action. International cooperation will enhance the EU's ability to respond to UAP-related risks while also benefiting from shared expertise, intelligence, and resources. Moreover, by incorporating UAP threats into energy security planning, the EU can ensure that its infrastructure is protected from all potential risks, whether conventional or unconventional.



## Energy related incidents with UAP

Here, several (video) articles are presented that focus on UAP & energy infrastructure or nuclear weapons;

Luis Elizondo, former Pentagon AATIP Director interview on UAP & Nuclear Technology

[https://youtu.be/tioJj\\_lqtLU?si=ImtHZXEQRKlhyXNI](https://youtu.be/tioJj_lqtLU?si=ImtHZXEQRKlhyXNI)

Castelo de Bode Hydroelectric dam, Portugal

<https://youtu.be/f6hejjZi-r8?si=liWJ0H5WEaqoW9In>

UAP activated launch sequence of nuclear weapons in Ukraine

[https://youtu.be/SR\\_Xv8CIS14?si=PoRjld09uCC0Py0e](https://youtu.be/SR_Xv8CIS14?si=PoRjld09uCC0Py0e)

Conisholme Wind Farm, UK

[http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk\\_news/england/lincolnshire/7817378.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/lincolnshire/7817378.stm)

Hartlepool Power Plant, UK

<https://world-nuclear-news.org/Articles/UFO-spotted-over-UK-nuclear-plant>

Testimony by Robert Salas, former USAF Captain at Malmstrom Air Force Base in the US

<https://youtu.be/JzlhmyEGHCU?si=3REf1m5tOvojjEim>

Testimony by Charles Halt, retired USAF Colonel, Deputy Base Commander at RAF Bentwaters in the UK

<https://youtu.be/y-62bjU-Rg?si=giSuCmyjzxGcXDrZ>

Hanford Plutonium Production Plant, US

[https://youtu.be/\\_ieZB\\_nk3HY](https://youtu.be/_ieZB_nk3HY)

St. Petersburg Nuclear Power Plant, Russia

<https://www.newsweek.com/russia-ufo-nuclear-power-plant-sighting-st-petersburg-1792868>

Leningrad Nuclear Power Plant, Russia

<https://www.jpost.com/omg/article-738663>

Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant, India

<https://www.geo.tv/latest/536957-ufo-sighting-over-nuclear-power-plant-in-india-baffles-locals>

Jamnagar Oil Refinery, India

<https://www.ibtimes.co.in/mysterious-object-hovering-above-jamnagar-refinery-sparks-ufo-rumours-433413>

Dimona Nuclear Plant, Israël

<https://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/12/16/israel.negev.shootdown/index.html>





## Recommendations

UAP should become a new element within the EU Energy Infrastructure Security topic and as strategic foresight<sup>38</sup> is an important element in creating future-proof policies in all sectors as stated in the Better Regulation Agenda<sup>39</sup> of the EC, the topic of Unidentified Anomalous Phenomena can not be ignored.

Therefore UAPCNL proposes that the EC organizes an EU UAP Energy & Security Conference where government representatives and organizations such as (but not limited to) UAPCNL, GEIPAN, Nucleareurope, ENTSO-e, Eurelectric, Nugenia, European Nuclear Society, Solarpower Europe, WindEurope, EREF, Hydropower Europe, Ocean Energy Europe and EGEN are invited, to learn more about UAP and discuss the implications of security regarding the EU Energy Infrastructure.

UAPCNL also recommends that UAP are implemented in the future preparedness strategy as recommended<sup>40</sup> in the European Council conclusions of March 2024 which invited the Council to take work forward, and the Commission together with the High Representative to propose actions to strengthen preparedness and crisis response at EU level in an all-hazards and whole-of society approach, taking into account Member States' responsibilities and competences.

Additionally, UAPCNL recommends that the topic of UAP be reviewed and where appropriate, incorporated into the guidelines, rules or regulations in regards to the OUTCOME OF PROCEEDINGS of Advancing Sustainable Electricity Grid Infrastructure - Council conclusions<sup>41</sup>

The creation of an EU UAP Unit in order to centralize the collection and analysis of UAP data across Member States, coordinate responses to potential incidents, and integrate UAP considerations into the broader EU energy security framework.

The European Union may fund independent organizations such as UAP Coalition Netherlands. The UAP Coalition Netherlands is available to support the establishment of an EU UAP Unit, through advice on its design and operation. Eventually we could also participate in its operation depending on for example availability of funds and legal frameworks. This could also be done in collaboration with other relevant organizations. Furthermore, UAPCNL is available to give presentations and briefings on the topic of UAP to various stakeholders.

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<sup>38</sup> [https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategic-foresight\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/strategic-foresight_en)

<sup>39</sup>

[https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation\\_en](https://commission.europa.eu/law/law-making-process/planning-and-proposing-law/better-regulation_en)

<sup>40</sup>

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/03/22/european-council-conclusions-21-and-22-march-2024/>

<sup>41</sup>

<https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2024/05/30/sustainable-electricity-grids-council-approves-conclusions/>



UAP Coalition  
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